

conference held by Muccio, President Rhee, and General MacArthur. Muccio recommended in the strongest terms full support of a "bold plan" that would be recommended by MacArthur to the JCS and said that an all-out effort was necessary if the situation were to be saved. (Tel 682) - - - - - (TAB 1)

2. 1:31 a.m. -- General MacArthur reported on his personal inspection of the South Korean battle area from Suwon north to the Han River. He concluded: "The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area." He said that, if authorized, he intended to move one American regimental combat team immediately "to the reinforcement of the vital area...and to provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive." (Army Message C-56942) - (TAB 2)

3. 3:40 a.m. -- In a tele-conference between General Collins and staff (Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bond present for State) and General MacArthur and staff, the latter requested a "clear-cut decision" as to whether he could be authorized to move one RCT to the combat area. General Collins replied that this would require a Presidential decision and suggested that the movement of troops be started under the directive of the previous day (Log, June 29, Entry 10). General MacArthur replied that this directive did not

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give him "sufficient latitude for efficient operation." General Collins then said he would request Presidential approval at once, and informed General MacArthur before the end of the teleconference that this approval had been obtained. A directive dispatched at 1:22 p.m. gave formal confirmation. It authorized CINCPAC to use his available Army forces as he had recommended (Entry 2)

"subject only to requirements for safety of Japan in the present situation which is a matter for your judgment." (DA TT 3444;

JCS 84718 to CINCPAC.) - - - - - (TAB 3)

4. 6:50 a.m. -- G-2 Tokyo in a teleconference with G-2 Washington reported that the South Korean army's morale was "bad", that it had suffered 60 per cent casualties and was reduced to a strength of 30,000 as against 100,000 North Koreans. The Government was disorganized and the population very pessimistic. There were unconfirmed reports of the presence of Chinese troops and Russian officers with the North Korean forces. (DA TT 3441) - - (TAB 4)

5. 7:57 a.m. -- Ambassador Kirk in Moscow interpreted Moscow's reply to the U.S. demarche (Log, June 26, Entry 18; June 27, Entry 11; June 29, Entry 6) as corroborating other evidence that the USSR was awaiting developments before taking a definite position concerning its own situation in the Korean affair. He recommended continued caution to avoid forcing the Soviet hand. (Tel 1773) - - - - - (TAB 5)

6. 7:50 a.m. -- Ambassador Kirk reported that unfortunately the telegram from Assistant Secretary of State Rusk (Log, June 29, Entry 3) had arrived after his conference with Gromyko. The Ambassador had felt the main object of the demarche was to get a
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definite expression as to whether the Soviets would or would not exercise influence for a North Korean withdrawal. In this he had failed because Gromyko had no authority to discuss matters orally.

(Tel 1772) - - - - - (TAB 6)

7. 8:05 a.m. -- The Political Adviser in Tokyo reported a telephone conversation with Ambassador Muccio in which the latter strongly urged an all-out effort before the South Koreans should panic and the "rapidly deteriorating situation" get out of hand.

(Tel 638) - - - - - (TAB 7)

3. 10:45 a.m. -- The President, in the presence of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Congressional leaders "a full review of the intensified military activities." He announced that he had authorized air operations against military targets in Northern Korea, had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast, and had authorized General MacArthur to use "certain supporting ground units." (Press Release) - - - - - (TAB 8)

9. [11:00 a.m.] -- The British Counselor of Embassy telephoned Mr. Bonbright that, in accordance with the request of Mr. Perkins to Ambassador Franks on June 28, the Foreign Office had urged the Hong Kong Government to take measures to stop exports to Northern Korea immediately. (Memo by Bonbright) - - - - - (TAB 9)

10. 12:30 p.m. -- Dr. Shao-hwa Tan, Chinese Minister, handed Mr. Freeman an aide-memoire indicating that the Chinese Government would make available 33,000 men for use in Korea. He said his Ambassador was disturbed by press reports from Formosa on military aid by China to Korea. These disclosures were "unauthorized". (Memo by Freeman) - - - - - (TAB 10)

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11. 3:00 p.m. -- The Argentine Ambassador informed the Secretary of State orally and in writing 1) that his Government gave decided support to the actions and decisions of the U.S. under the present circumstances, and 2) that Argentina had ratified the Rio Pact. (Memo by Birgfeld) In a background memo written for the Secretary before the interview ARA stated that ratification of the Rio Pact, pending since 1948, had been hastened by the Korean crisis and was "in effect a fulfillment of Peron's numerous statements...that if the United States became involved in a conflict with the USSR, Argentina would support the United States".

(ARA Memo) - - - - - (TAB 11)

12. 3:00 p.m. -- The Security Council met. The Delegate of Egypt reported instructions of his Government which required him to abstain from the vote on the resolution of June 27. The Delegate of India reported instructions of his Government authorizing him to support that resolution. The Council noted communications of support for the resolution from a large number of UN member states and offers of assistance from some. The Delegate of France replied to the Soviet statement contesting the validity of the Council's action. The United States Delegate reported to the Council the statement of the President on the intensification of American military activities in Korea. (Security Council Official Records, No. 17, 30 June 1950) - - - - - (TAB 12)

13. 3:04 p.m. -- Ambassador Douglas reported some apprehension in London "that certain less responsible members of the Cabinet may be persuaded by North Korean regime to make a joint declaration of political unity which would include a demand for withdrawal of U.S. support." (Tel 3752) - - - - - (TAB 13)

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14. 3:16 p.m. -- Ambassador Henderson reported a discussion with Secretary General Bajpai of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in which the latter said only one Cabinet Minister opposed acceptance of the Security Council resolutions. Bajpai said India hoped, however, she would not be compelled to give up her policy of "development of friendly relations with all countries." Henderson advised the Department that Nehru did not like our Formosa and Indo-China policies, and that care should be exercised to say nothing which might appear to indicate a belief that India supported all of our Far Eastern policies. (Tel 983) - - - - - (TAB 14)

15. 3:20 p.m. -- The Canadian Ambassador told Mr. Hickerson that his Government had ordered three destroyers to get ready to sail for Pearl Harbor but that no orders had been issued to place the vessels under the operation of U.S. commanders; he said that the Canadian Government desired to have the Canadian contribution under a UN "mantle or bridge" and that this should take the form of a Security Council resolution asking the U.S. or General MacArthur to assume command of forces made available. (Memo by Hickerson) - - - - - (TAB 15)

16. 3:30 p.m. -- The Norwegian Ambassador in an interview with the Secretary offered congratulations on the "great stand" taken by President Truman and the American Government in the Korean crisis which he said had greatly heartened the smaller European nations. In reply to questions by the Ambassador, the Secretary replied there was no new evidence of an immediate Soviet intention to act in the Baltic or elsewhere. The Ambassador agreed with the Secretary's view that Chinese Communist admission to the UN was now

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excluded by the hostile attitude they assumed toward UN action in Korea. (Memo by the Secretary) - - - - - (TAB 16)

17. 3:45 p.m. -- In a call on Mr. Merchant Counselor Graves of the British Embassy remarked that the defense line in the Far East would be strengthened by the specific inclusion and public mention of Hong Kong. Mr. Merchant replied that it had been our understanding the British were confident they could look after Hong Kong themselves. He replied in the negative to a question as to whether the President's statement implied a change of policy toward the Chinese Nationalist Government. He stressed the urgency we attached to the request previously made that oil shipments to the mainland China be cut off. (Memo by Merchant) - - - (TAB 17)

18. 3:50 p.m. -- The JCS instructed CINCPAC that the decision to accept or reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments "should properly be made at highest levels in Washington." If Chiang offered troops to MacArthur, the latter was to refer him to the State Department, which had been advised that such an offer "should be declined at present." (JCS 94737 to CINCPAC) - - (TAB 18)

19. 11:15 p.m. -- Ambassador Bay reported that the morale of Norwegian officials had improved due to U.S. firmness in the Korean situation, and that the Norwegian Foreign Office did not expect any new Soviet moves. The First Secretary of the Italian Embassy had been told by his colleague in the Soviet Embassy, apparently under instructions, that "not one Russian soldier will be sent into Korean territory" in the present developments. (Tel 624) - - - - - (TAB 19)

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Other Actions, June 30

(Listed here are entries for which no exact time is available.)

20. The United States informed the Secretary General of the UN that it had instituted an embargo on all U.S. exports to the North Korean area, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of June 25 that no assistance be given to the North Korean authorities. (Security Council Document) - - - - - (TAB 20)

21. Australia informed the Secretary General that it had "decided to place at the service of the UN through the American authorities the RAAF fighter squadron now stationed in Japan," and that plans for return of the British Commonwealth occupation forces to Australia were to be held in abeyance. (Security Council Document) - - - - - (TAB 21)

22. Chile cabled to the UN its support of the Security Council resolutions regarding Korea and offered to ensure "regular and adequate supplies of copper, saltpetre and other strategic materials to countries responsible for operations." (Security Council Document) - - - - - (TAB 22)

23. Poland informed the Secretary General of its rejection of the Security Council resolution of June 27, and accused the United States of aggression against Korea and China. (Security Council Document) - - - - - (TAB 23)

24. Mr. Cordier of the UN Secretariat expressed to Mr. Noyes of USUN his disappointment over U.S. unreadiness to move at once to provide apparatus implementing the Security Council resolutions. He urged immediate consideration be given to a committee to coordinate offers of assistance for Korea, designation of a UN Commander and use of the UN flag. (USUN Memo by Noyes, US/S/1269) - - (TAB 24)

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25. Senator O'Mahoney telephoned the Under Secretary to express his concern that the opposition in Congress might try to mount a heavy attack on the Department of State on the ground that it had had knowledge of the seriousness of the Korean situation and yet apparently had been reluctant to do anything about it earlier. He suggested that previous statements made by the Department be checked and that consideration be given to an early statement to head off possibilities of an attack. (Memo by McWilliams) - - - (TAB 25)

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Annexes

(Background and Collateral material)

- A. Circular Information Telegram to All Missions - - - - - (TAB A)
- B. Special Information Policy Guidance on Korea, No. 7 and No. 8 (TAB B)
- C. "World Reaction to Korean Developments, No. 3," by OIR - - - (TAB C)
- D. "Reactions in Latin America to U.S. and UN decisions regarding
the Events in Korea" (DFA-IP 142.1) - - - - - (TAB D)
- E. Press Release No. 702, "Soviet Allegation of Illegality of
United Nations Security Council Action with Respect to Korea." (TAB E)

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Summary of Actions and Decisions - July 3, 1950

(All entries are in EDT; on incoming telegrams the time of receipt is used.)

1. 12:31 a.m. -- The CINCFE recommended that he issue at once a statement that prisoners taken in Korea would be treated in accordance with humanitarian principles, that he expected the same treatment from the North Koreans toward prisoners taken by them, and that he would hold responsible any individual North Korean deviating from these principles or permitting or causing any such deviation. (CINCFE to Army C 57118) - - - - - (TAB 1)

2. 4:40 a.m. -- Charge Strong reported a conversation with K.C. Wu, Governor of Formosa, who, Strong cabled, "seems believe US will soon be at war with Soviets and as natural corollary will underwrite invasion of mainland from Formosa." Wu said he was urging the Generalissimo to offer Formosa port facilities to the Seventh Fleet, but Chiang hesitated because he feared the offer would be rejected and cause him loss of face. (Tel. 7) - - - - - (TAB 2)

3. 6:47 a.m. -- G-2 Tokyo reported in a teleconference: the continued buildup of North Korean forces south of the Han River to the north and east of Suwon; the landing by an undetermined number of North Koreans at Wonsan Island; lack of enemy opposition to our aircraft in the preceding 24 hours; the disorganization and ineffectiveness of guerrillas in South Korea; the absence of evidence of Soviet participation or other indications of hostile Soviet intentions; continued movement of U.S. ground forces into Korea; resumption of UNCOK authority in Korea by UN representatives who had returned there from Tokyo. Army Psychological Warfare Division in Washington recommended